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Abstract
When detainees go on hunger strike or riot or occupy the 
roofs of detention centres, their actions are usually nar-
rated by governments keen to discredit them and their 
actions as criminal and manipulative and evidence of their 
barbarity and difference. A secondary, counter-narration 
is provided by detainee supporters who explain the actions 
as evidence of detainees’ distress and deteriorating mental 
health. The voices of the actors themselves, people held in 
detention and taking protest action, are rarely heard in 
depth. Drawing on in-depth interviews with refugees for-
merly held in Australian immigration detention centres, 
and the works of Hannah Arendt, this article argues that 
the experience of immigration detention is fundamentally 
dehumanizing and that while detainee protest was aimed 
at attaining certain material outcomes, it also served 
important existential functions. The fact of protest was a 
rejection of a powerless state, a way for detained refugees 
to experience their own agency and, with it, restoration of 
some of the “essential characteristics of human life” and a 
means to use their reduction to “bare humanity” as a basis 
for insisting upon a place in the polis.
Résumé
Lorsque ceux qui sont détenus s’engagent dans des grèves 
de faim ou des émeutes, ou encore occupent le toit des 
centres de détention, leurs actions sont reformulées par 
des gouvernements, motivés par le désir de les dénigrer, en 
récits qui mettent en évidence leur prétendue criminalité, 
leur volonté manipulatrice, leur barbarie et leur différence. 
Un deuxième courant qui va à l’encontre de ces récits est 
véhiculé par les sympathisants des détenus, et consiste à 
montrer que leurs actions découlent de la détresse qu’ils 
ressentent et de la détérioration de leur santé mentale. 
Cependant les voix des actants eux-mêmes, notamment 
ceux qui sont détenus et s’engagent dans des actions de 
contestation, se font rarement entendre d’une manière 
significative. En se basant sur des entrevues en profondeur 
avec des réfugiés détenus antérieurement dans des centres 
de détention pour immigrés en Australie, ainsi que sur 
l’œuvre de Hannah Arendt, cet article avance que l’expé-
rience de la détention d’immigration est profondément 
déshumanisante, et que les actes de contestation de la part 
des détenus, bien qu’ils visaient dans un premier temps 
certains objectifs matériels, remplissaient également des 
fonctions existentielles importantes. Le fait de contestation 
représentait le rejet d’un état d’impuissance, un moyen par 
lequel les réfugiés détenus pouvaient ressentir leur propre 
volonté d’action, et conséquemment, un rétablissement de 
certaines « caractéristiques essentielles de la vie humaine » 
(“essential characteristics of human life”). C’était égale-
ment une façon de se servir de leur réduction à un état 
d’humanité dénudée (“bare humanity”) pour insister sur 
leur place dans le polis ou communauté politique dans 
lequel ils se trouvaient.   
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Introduction
The use of immigration detention is on the rise globally. More than one million people pass through immigration detention centres in the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and Europe each year.1 They are held in 
over-crowded, dilapidated detention centres or in modern, 
purpose-built facilities designed as “super-max” prisons, 
allocated an identification number, subjected to arbitrary 
rules and sometimes to arbitrary and excessive use of force, 
and distanced from legal protections by their incarceration. 
They have little knowledge and little political voice: they are 
non-citizens, non-people.2 Life inside immigration deten-
tion centres is precarious, filled with uncertainty and mon-
otony and, too often, degrading treatment. As the use of 
immigration detention has risen, so too has detainee protest. 
When detainees go on a hunger strike or riot or occupy the 
roofs of detention centres, their actions are usually narrated 
by governments keen to discredit them and their actions 
as criminal, manipulative, and evidence of their barbarity 
and difference.3 A secondary, counter-narration is provided 
by detainee supporters who explain the actions as evidence 
of detainees’ distress and deteriorating mental health. The 
voices of the actors themselves, people held in detention and 
taking protest action, are rarely heard in any depth. Refu-
gees are typically presented in popular discourse as either 
victims or villains and almost never as conscious agents. 
While most OECD countries have administrative immi-
gration detention, Australia is unique in that its immigra-
tion detention is both mandatory and indefinite. All people 
who do not have lawful status in the country are detained, 
regardless of individual characteristics or vulnerabilities 
(such as psychological or physical health, age, or flight risk). 
There are no statutory limits to detention and, unless there 
is ministerial intervention, detainees are typically held until 
granted a visa or removed from the country, a process that 
can take several months to several years. Detainees have no 
way of predicting how long they will be incarcerated. 
This article arises from a four-year study of refugee pro-
test against immigration detention in Australia based on 
in-depth interviews with formerly detained refugees, dur-
ing which every respondent, without prompting, said, “I 
am human,” or “We are human.”4 Using Hannah Arendt’s5 
works on human rights and The Human Condition to ana-
lyze detainee testimony, I propose that the experience of 
immigration detention is fundamentally dehumanizing6 
and that while detainee protest was aimed at attaining 
certain outcomes such as obtaining access to telephones, 
halting forced removals, or affecting refugee status deter-
mination, it also served important existential functions. 
The fact of protest was a rejection of a powerless state, a way 
for detained refugees to experience their own agency and 
with it, restoration of some of the “essential characteristics 
of human life” and a means to use their reduction to “bare 
humanity” as a basis for insisting upon a place in the polis. 
A close reading of refugee protest gives insight into the daily 
relations and regimens of immigration detention centres, 
but also important philosophical and theoretical insights 
into understanding the human subject of human rights.
The Human Condition and Human Rights
“Respect. Just respect. When someone respect me I respect 
him, because the respect it’s belong just to human. Animal 
won’t respect you, animal will obey you, because you feed 
them. They don’t know the respect. They walking with you, 
dog walking with you, suddenly without ‘Excuse me’ he 
just pee in the road. But a human, it’s the respect between 
each other. So when we say that we are human, show some 
respect. That’s it” (Osman).7
A recurring theme among refugees interviewed was a 
desire to be recognized as human. Embedded in these calls 
was an appeal to a shared or universal humanity and an 
implied belief that human status entails a guarantee of a 
minimum standard of treatment, an implicit acknowledge-
ment of a human rights framework. At times respondents 
made overt pleas to human rights as a way to improve their 
situations, while at other times the inference of human 
rights was less explicit. Humanity and rights as referred to 
by refugees in immigration detention seldom arose from a 
substantive knowledge of international human rights laws 
and systems (although some participants in this research 
did have extensive knowledge of formal human rights 
systems). Detainees nonetheless found human rights to 
be a powerful language for articulating injustice. Every 
person interviewed in this research complained of feeling 
dehumanized and unrecognized in detention. Some com-
pared their status to that of animals, inanimate objects, or 
death. Osman expressed his frustration at being reduced to 
a status lower than an animal: “When officer call me ‘0276,’ 
I said, ‘Oh God! I’ve got name. Your donkey or your dog and 
your cat has name. I’m a human like you. Don’t call me by 
number.’”
Detainees’ physical survival needs were met with shel-
ter, food, and clothing, but former detainees testified that 
human life entails more than physical survival. An existen-
tial aspect to human life that distinguishes humans from 
animals cannot be reduced to mere biology. Detainee cries 
of “We are human” were appeals for recognition of such an 
aspect. Former detainees interviewed in this work, regard-
less of how much they knew about formal human rights 
systems, shared an unshakeable belief that to be human—
morally if not legally—entitled them to certain rights.
Volume 32 Refuge Number 1
19
Hannah Arendt’s work provides a theoretical framework 
for better understanding why immigration detention is 
experienced as so utterly dehumanizing and for interrogat-
ing detainee protest as a way to resist dehumanizing regimes 
and insist upon a recognizably human life. 
Dehumanizing Categories
Arendt makes a distinction between what and who a person 
is.8 A person may be identified and categorized as a woman, 
Jew, Muslim, asylum seeker, or “boatperson” from charac-
teristics such as dress, appearance, or context, such as on an 
overcrowded boat off Australia’s northern coast.9 However, 
she can reveal who she is in particular, only through her own 
speech and action. The individual characteristics that dis-
tinguish each unique person can be discerned only through 
the revelations of that person, gained intersubjectively 
through interaction and engagement on a basis of equality. 
The “what” of a person can only ever be an approximation 
of humanity, consisting of stereotypes into which individ-
uals are grouped with little or no regard for the uniqueness 
of each person. To treat a person according to what rather 
than who she is, Arendt contends, dehumanizes the person. 
She is denied the opportunity to reveal herself to the world, 
denied entry to the public sphere as an initiating and equal 
person, and reduced to a representative sample of the cat-
egory into which she has been placed: “If a Negro in a white 
community is considered a Negro and nothing else, he 
loses along with his right to equality that freedom of action 
which is specifically human; all his deeds are now explained 
as ‘necessary’ consequence of some ‘Negro’ qualities; he has 
become some specimen of an animal species called man.”10 
When treated primarily or only as a representative of a group, 
such as “boatpeople,” a person’s humanness is not recognized 
and she is reduced to a state of biology. She then holds no spe-
cific value as an individual, and her life becomes unimport-
ant and potentially superfluous. Detainees understood and 
felt this lack of individual recognition keenly. Dr. Aamer 
Sultan commented, “That’s one of the arguments I used to 
leave with many Australians outside, that the government 
are doing that now to people who are in detention: outsiders, 
migrants, Arab, Muslim, it doesn’t matter. What guarantee 
that they won’t do the same to someone else outside? Started 
with the homeless people, the Aborigines in a way.”
Aamer could see that when encountered only as a repre-
sentative of a group—“Arab, Muslim”—he didn’t matter and 
was interchangeable with “homeless people” or “Aborigines.” 
Emad expressed a similar concern. He complained that 
when he was in detention, the authorities made no attempt 
to discern any individuality, but that instead detainees were 
treated as just that.
Not all people are the same. Mentally, some of the people can 
cope with the circumstance there. Some of them, the majority 
of them—especially kids and women—cannot. So the manage-
ment and the immigration didn’t take into consideration that the 
people are different. They behaved in a one rough manner, one 
rough standard towards all of the people, and that’s completely 
wrong. You’re being tough to everyone. You have to understand 
every person’s need—or try to understand. Even if you fail, try 
to understand. Try to take some effort to understand. That we 
couldn’t see, we didn’t see at all actually. We just saw some … 
a very hard-line treatment and it was typical every day, every 
morning, every night. They didn’t try to investigate what’s in our 
hearts or mind. And we believed that humans can, actually can, 
reach to the hearts and minds of the other humans. But unfortu-
nately it wasn’t the case at that time. 
Ibrahim also expressed frustration at the sameness of 
all detainees when he said, “It’s wrong. But for us, we been 
just all same. Refugee or criminal or whatever—you the 
same. Like the children, women, anyone.” He complained 
that any individual speech or action in detention had no 
impact on the way in which he or his fellow detainees were 
treated. He, and those detained with him, had been categor-
ized as “unlawful entrants” and would be treated accord-
ingly until re-categorized as “refugee.” At heart, it was this 
bureaucratic dehumanization that the cry “We are human” 
struggled against and that refugee protest sought to counter.
The Right to Have Rights
Arendt conceived of human rights in two groups. Civic 
rights are “all those rights which require the protection of 
a government,”11 including all the rights contained in inter-
national human rights treaties such as the right to adequate 
food and shelter, the right to vote, to education, to freedom of 
movement, and so on. Prior to this group of rights however, 
is “the right to have rights,” which she defined as the right to 
“a place in the world which makes opinions significant and 
actions effective.”12 For Arendt this meant that meaning-
ful speech and action, and plurality based on equality and 
distinction are necessary elements for a human life to be 
recognizable as such and to rise above mere survival. 
Speech and action are fundamental dimensions of the 
human condition and distinguish us from other animals. If 
we are deprived of the opportunity to speak and act, and to 
engage with other human beings on a basis of equality, we 
are denied an essential aspect of our humanity. Speech and 
action become meaningful only when they are recognized 
by others, and this recognition constitutes and conveys our 
equality and our membership in the polis. Conversely, when 
our speech and actions are ignored by those around us, we 
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become a non-person and have no impact on the common 
world beyond the private sphere of personal relationships. 
It was precisely this non-existence that Farshid referred to 
when he said, “People’s situation in detention was that you 
were the lost person, the forgotten person, you don’t exist, 
you cannot change anything, and you have no power over 
anything.” 
Belonging to a political community and participating in 
the public life of that community is a fundamental aspect of 
the human condition. Humans are distinguished from gods 
and beasts by our capacity for action and our existence in 
plurality. Arendt argues that since Aristotle, humans have 
been “defined as … commanding the power of speech and 
thought … and as the ‘political animal’ … one who lives in 
a community.”13 Being a “political animal” is not the same 
as being a social animal, which requires individuals to live 
together for procreation or survival. Politics has an added 
existential depth and involves the capacity to organize and 
create a world of human affairs, the common world. It is 
this that distinguishes human life.14 Therefore, the loss of 
a political community means the loss of “some of the most 
essential characteristics of human life.”15 
In order to understand how the loss of recognition in the 
public sphere equates to the loss of humanity, it is necessary 
to look in greater detail at two key aspects of Arendt’s con-
ception of the human condition; first, the human need for 
meaningful speech and action and, second, plurality, that 
consists of equality and distinction.
Meaningful Speech and Action
Arendt identifies meaningful speech and action as a neces-
sary condition for a life that is “fully human” and enters the 
common world as an equal. It is through individual speech 
and action, recognized and judged by others, that each 
individual human being reveals her unique and distinct 
self to the world: “In acting and speaking, men show who 
they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and 
thus make their appearance in the human world, while their 
physical identities appear without any activity of their own 
… This disclosure of ‘who’ in contradistinction to ‘what’ 
somebody is—is implicit in everything somebody says and 
does. It can be hidden only in complete silence and perfect 
passivity.”16 
But a life of silence and passivity is, according to Arendt 
“dead to the world.” Actively participating in public life is 
necessary for human life to be distinct from “mere bodily 
existence,” and it is through meaningful engagement with 
others as equals that human life distinguishes itself.17 Ismail 
remarked that if he had not protested against the regimen 
of detention, but instead had silently and passively accepted 
his position, he would cease to be alive in any meaningful 
sense: “Because if I didn’t do those things, nothing different 
between me and this table. With me? I got a soul. I got a 
mind. I got thinking.” 
Sayed expressed a similar opinion when he explained 
why he and others took action against detention: “That’s 
what happens, that’s the main purpose everybody do what 
they do. Otherwise there is no difference between the live and 
the dead you know. Otherwise I could be dead—nothing.” 
When someone’s speech and action are not recognized, 
she is treated and judged, not according to who she is 
(through her words and deeds), but according to her mem-
bership in a category. This refusal to recognize someone’s 
individuality is a refusal to recognize a fundamental aspect 
of her humanity and is profoundly dehumanizing. When 
Arendt speaks of the individual, it is not the pre-existing 
abstract autonomous individual of Enlightenment thought, 
upon which modern politics is based, but rather, she is refer-
ring to an ontologically intersubjective and interdependent 
individual. “The self for Arendt is the self of a human com-
munity that is formed through and cannot exist without 
interacting in the world.”18 The power of speech and action 
is not only a capacity for self-revelation, consisting of the 
disclosure of a pre-formed and complete self to a waiting 
world, but is simultaneously self-constituting. Humanity is 
fundamentally plural, and plurality is an inescapable and a 
desirable dimension of humanity. 
Plurality: Equality and Distinction 
Plurality, for Arendt, paradoxically consists of distinction 
and equality. Humans share certain essential characteris-
tics, but unlike the potentially homogenizing force of uni-
versalist or essentialist arguments, Arendt’s “human condi-
tion” is based on distinction, both of humans from other 
animals and of every human from every other human. “We 
are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody 
is ever the same as anybody else who ever lived, lives, or will 
live.”19 Every human is different and distinct, though we all 
share the capacity to initiate, to create, to think, to speak, 
and to act, and these capacities are core to human life. No 
two people are ever absolutely identical, and it is through 
the insertion of the individual self in the common or pub-
lic world that each of us contributes to the human artifice, 
which constitutes the common world and ourselves at the 
same time. Plurality requires difference and multiplicity. A 
necessary tandem element of plurality is equality.
Equality, for Arendt, does not refer to the equal distribu-
tion of material goods, nor to an abstract equality inherent 
in the human condition, but equality as a political decision 
and as the basis for politics shaped by justice, rather than 
coercion or force: “We are not born equal; we become equal 
as members of a group on the strength of our decision to 
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guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights. Our political 
life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality 
through organisation, because man can act in and change 
and build a common world, together with his equals and 
only with his equals.”20 
Inequality and a lack of recognition of detainees’ basic 
humanity shaped interactions between detainees and officials 
and was reinforced through every aspect of detention life. 
Food was raised as an issue by almost everyone interviewed. 
For Osman, the poor food was an issue of inequality. He com-
plained to the detention manager and said, “The way you eat 
in your home, bring it to us.” Most people expressed the lack 
of equality as a lack of respect. Ibrahim, when asked what he 
needed to feel human, responded, “To be respected as a human. 
To be treated as a human. So you can feel your humanity and 
dignity. It’s very important. It’s very simple too. That’s what we 
were asking for, and unfortunately, we didn’t find it. We found 
the opposite thing, which is they treated us as an animal, and 
maybe even the dog … because the manager of the camp has 
a dog, and I think the dog, he was luckier than me. Seriously.” 
Arendt considered respect an essential foundation for 
politics that is based on mutual equality rather than force. She 
described respect as a public sphere sentiment that acts as a 
basis for human relationships, similar to the way in which love 
binds relationships in the private sphere: “Yet what love is in 
its own narrowly circumscribed sphere, respect is in the larger 
domain of human affairs. Respect, not unlike the Aristotelian 
philia politikē, is a kind of ‘friendship’ without intimacy and 
without closeness; it is a regard for the person from the dis-
tance which the space of the world puts between us, and in this 
regard is independent of qualities which we may admire or of 
achievements which we may highly esteem.”21 
In this light, the respect that Ibrahim and others said 
they needed in order to “feel human” can be understood 
as representing their equality and belonging. Because we 
are intersubjectively and interdependently constituted, a 
widespread lack of respect in the public sphere can easily 
lead to civic death, or what Farshid described as being “the 
lost person, the forgotten person, you don’t exist.” A refusal 
to be lost or forgotten, to accept their civic non-existence, 
regardless of material outcomes, was a major motivation in 
much detainee protest action.
Detainee Protest as Restoration to a “Human” 
Status
Refugee protest against detention sometimes achieved its 
stated aim, such as a mass hunger strike in January 2002 
at Woomera. The Australian government suspended the 
processing of claims from Afghan applicants after the allied 
invasion of Afghanistan. The hunger strike was started by 
Afghan detainees, but people from other nationalities soon 
joined in. At its peak, detainees reported that 370 men, 
women, and children were on strike, and 70 sewed their 
lips.22 The strike lasted for sixteen days and called for a 
resumption of processing claims and an improvement in the 
conditions of detention. Woomera detention centre became 
difficult to run and attracted significant media attention. 
The government sent in negotiators and, after initially label-
ling the strike as “barbaric” and refusing to be “manipulated” 
by such behaviour, finally agreed to resume processing and 
improve conditions.23 Protests seldom achieved changes 
in government policies or actions and could be viewed as 
“failed” by some, but detainees overwhelmingly saw protest 
action as effective. For detainees, protest was aimed partly 
at external goals, but it also carried important restora-
tive functions. It was a way to reject the powerless state of 
“detainee,” to re-experience their agency, and to insist upon 
entry to the polis as political subjects rather than objects. 
Especially after a protest, I would feel proud of myself. ’Cause I 
did something that every free man would do. You know? You are 
not dead body. You are human, you have got dream. So when you 
do those things and you come back to your room and think “Oh 
that was good.” Even if we didn’t achieve what we wanted, like 
talking with Immigration or bring Immigration to see us, but at 
least you feel like the things inside your chest come out. It’s better 
than inside, you get sick. You feel a little bit open and relax, until 
the next action. (Osman)
Detention centres are extraordinarily controlled 
environments, where communication, food, activity, move-
ment, and information are tightly regulated and monitored. 
Detainees have little opportunity to participate in decision-
making, either at the mundane level of deciding what to eat, 
or in more fundamental matters such as education, work, 
or political status. Despite the unequal power relationship 
between the state and detainees, however, they were not 
entirely without power. Detainees had less political, material, 
and semiotic power than the state, but they retained human 
capacities for thought, speech, and action; they retained 
agency. Resistance was an important way for detainees to 
experience their own agency, to take a decision not to eat 
the food on offer, or to create a disturbance and force a 
response from authorities such as through self-harming or 
breaking a piece of camp infrastructure. 
Detainees’ bodies were a site for the exercise of state 
sovereignty, but also for detainees to reclaim sovereignty 
of self. Lacking power over their external environment, they 
sought to exercise power over their own bodies, and through 
this to influence their environment and regain a sense of self. 
Shahin explained the high incidence of hunger strike as a way 
of experiencing and expressing control over one’s own body 
Volume 32 Refuge Number 1
22
and refusing the omnipotent power of the state: “This would 
happen because you have no choice. You can’t make any deci-
sions in your life. Just to show you are alive, you could make a 
decision to stop receiving anything in your body. That would 
show that you were alive, because you could make a decision, 
in a place that you can’t make any decision.” 
Many former detainees interviewed in this research project 
had conducted hunger strikes, many of which had achieved the 
stated aims. Sayed was transferred to a prison when the deten-
tion centre became too full. He refused to eat or comply with 
the prison regime for several days before he was transferred 
back to detention. Many people said that the official mech-
anisms for getting anything not routinely provided simply 
didn’t work. Baha’adin explained that if he had a headache 
and wanted paracetamol, he would be required to lodge a 
request form, which usually got no response or was granted 
several days later. He soon learned, as Sayed explained 
that “if you ask for the request—you don’t get it, but if you 
shout and do something, break something up, you get all 
these things done.” Compliance with the system was largely 
ineffective and gave people no sense of their own power. 
The rates of self-harming are many times higher in deten-
tion than in asylum-seeker and refugee populations outside 
of detention, and it is understood as a sign of poor mental 
health.24 While some detainees also saw it this way, some 
explained that it was a way of experiencing one’s agency. For 
Issaq, the need to be the initiator of an action and provoke 
a reaction could be met through cutting himself. His self-
harming was an effort to make his actions meaningful.
I wanted to have something to look forward, then slash my wrists 
and see what’s going to happen. You know what I mean? Just 
something out of ordinary. I mean I know that I’m sitting here and 
watching that tree, nothing going to happen. I won’t get a visa, I 
won’t get out of here and every day going to be the same. But I want 
to change it. The only power I have to just slash my wrists and see 
what’s going to happen after it. Will it cause attention or not? Will 
it, you know? You’ll hope for a change. To use all what you have 
to change—I mean, not to get out of detention, but change what’s 
happening now. I mean, I’m sitting here, by doing nothing, noth-
ing would change. But by slashing my wrists there are going to be 
some action at least. At least five officers are going to come out of 
the door, nurse is going to come, and all these things. Something 
going to happen out of ordinary, and in terms of self-harm that 
was the thing I was looking for. All the power that you have. That’s 
all the power, not just a little of it. That’s all you have.
When Issaq was compliant, he could be ignored, but when 
he self-harmed, the authorities must react. His apparently 
destructive self-harming paradoxically brought him closer 
to a place in the world in which his actions were meaningful.
Sam didn’t self-harm during his three years in detention, 
but he was a trusted confidant of many fellow detainees 
and talked with many people who were self-harming. His 
explanation is similar to Issaq’s, but with less concern for 
provoking an external reaction than an internal one. He 
said self-harm “in most cases wasn’t a planned thing. It was 
in most cases out of frustration and it was good in a way that 
people feel they are real again, they exist, they have power 
over something—their body. So blood always has a very 
powerful message, and when people see they can get over 
their fear and do something, certain thing—harsh thing, 
they come back to that colour of existence—I have power, I 
can do things. So I was calling that self-actualization out of 
frustration in that situation.” 
The omnipotent power and control of the detention 
environment and the dehumanization of non-citizenship 
reached into every aspect of detainees’ lives. Their daily rou-
tines were micromanaged to such an extent that people lost 
their sense of self. Protests ranging from breaking a light 
bulb through to self-harm, hunger strike, and riot were a 
way of re-experiencing oneself as an agent and of reclaiming 
human status.
Insisting on a Place in the Polis
Much detainee resistance was outwardly aimed, that is, 
there was a specific external target audience and/or goal that 
the protest sought to achieve. Most was targeted at achiev-
ing specific material changes such as getting a light bulb 
replaced in a room, gaining increased access to telephones, 
or securing the release of all detainees. These actions were 
directed primarily at those with explicit power over the 
detention environment: government officials and security 
guards. Other forms of resistance were aimed not at gov-
ernment or others directly involved in detention, but at the 
broader population seeking semiotic change, to effect their 
representations and position in Australian politics. The tar-
get audience of these protests was the Australian and inter-
national community (typically through the media, but also 
through refugee supporters outside), and the aim was to 
disrupt and unsettle government accounts of their presence 
in Australia and their actions in detention, and to insert 
their own narrative alongside their own actions. Detainee 
protest marked a refusal to allow official government or 
bureaucratic explanations of their presence and actions to 
go unchallenged and to insist on active, conscious participa-
tion in the political debate. 
Detainees saw that they were being used as pawns in 
Australia’s national politics, in particular, that there was 
political capital for the government in their suffering, and 
that their suffering was intended to be public and to deter 
prospective asylum seekers overseas. Ibrahim believed that 
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detention was “a plan to punish these people to be honest. 
This plan has been well managed by someone with high 
authority in the hierarchy to punish these people and to 
make them a good example for others … people are gonna 
think twice before they come to here.” Mehdi reached a sim-
ilar conclusion: “We were the victim of Australian policy to 
just stop people coming illegally or something. We were the 
victim and they wanted to show people that we keep them 
… It’s not a matter of ‘What’s your story or what …?” It’s 
just ‘Keep that person.’ That’s it. They needed to keep some 
people … for a long time to say that ‘We are strong against 
these people.’”
Emad agreed and added that the theatre of detention gave 
material proof of the government’s strength and resolve to 
protect Australia’s borders and that this was a deliberate 
strategy to retain government. 
Their intention was to give a real strong lesson to the outer world 
not to come to Australia, OK, by restraining us a group. It’s just a 
misfortunate incident, bad timing for us. Someone wants to give a 
lesson to the whole world through us. They wanted to say, “If you 
come to Australia that will be your destiny. You will be treated 
like this.” So, we are subjected to a political, not legal, pressure—a 
political pressure that the government, at that time, needed to get 
votes from the ordinary Australian people. And that’s what I think 
happened. In reality one of the main aspects for John Howard 
election—and he won the election at that time—is that he used 
immigration as a pressure point, as an element in his campaign 
to defeat Labor. So we were the source of this election campaign 
… Unfortunately they didn’t look at us as humans in need for their 
help. They looked at us as a human that they can use in their elec-
tion to win and to prevail. And I think that’s completely wrong. 
(Emphasis added)
This analysis is important, because once people had 
determined that their fate rested not on an individual 
assessment of each person’s claims, but on national polit-
ical interests, detainees lost faith in the official systems and 
began to consider alternate actions to resolve their situation. 
Detainees realized that they needed to establish a political 
voice for themselves, and reaching the media became a 
major focus of protest action. There was considerable debate 
among detainees about how to do this. Many feared that 
violent protests would reinforce the government represen-
tation of them as “uncivilized,” a people to be feared, and 
the perception that their detention was necessary to protect 
Australia from dangerous people. Many others believed that 
non-violent protests would go unnoticed. As Issaq argued,
Peacefully doesn’t answer anything because there is no journos 
here. We need to get journos here, and how we can do it? Just go 
to a town and sit in there until journos gets here? Or just burn the 
place down and the smoke will bring journalists, you know? That 
became the main point, just to get the journalists coming there, to 
make a scene, have a story for a TV or radio or newspaper … for 
journalists to fly in there and see us, because they had to come 
from Adelaide, and it was like 500k away. So they needed a good 
story. People sewing their lips in detention was a good story or 
people burning down the centres was a good story, even though 
it was relative. But it was getting into a media … We didn’t care 
about negative publicity. We just wanted to get people to come to 
detentions and sit.
Dr. Aamer Sultan was initially opposed to hunger strikes, 
lip-sewing, and violent protests and did not participate in 
any of these actions during his three years in detention. 
But looking back, he was less resolute in his objection. He 
said that he was “very unhappy” about how “the media had 
shown those aggressive criminals” but that in hindsight 
it was a positive thing … At last the government did the mistake 
of transferring the camera into there, let the people know at least 
there are some people there. I mean it’s just the beginning of 
questioning “Who are those people? We don’t know about them. 
We worry about them. Criminals or not, even the most dangerous 
people in the world, or maybe the other way around, we just want 
know about it.” It’s just the fact that this has transferred the argu-
ment from a faceless people into actual people doing something 
bad or good, it doesn’t matter.
Most actions were targeted not at government officials or 
detention centre guards. They were aimed to achieve semi-
otic change, to insist on a political voice for detainees a place 
in the polis. Detainees wanted to speak directly to “fellow 
human beings.” After his release, Shahin urged people he 
met to “write letters to people in detention centres. Get in 
touch. There is a wall the government has created. And this 
wall needs to be chipped away from both ways. People from 
inside are doing their way, for you really the best way is to get 
to know them. As long as that wall is there, the government 
can do what they want. And once it is broken or has holes 
in it, then it’s very hard.” He was convinced that with direct 
communication “people could see a human face behind the 
kind of stories that they had heard or they had seen on the 
TV. It was very different to be that close.” 
Shahin’s comments reveal an Arendtian understanding 
of the political sphere, a common space in which people 
can develop and test their opinions with one another on an 
equal basis, where membership is confirmed not through 
formal citizenship, but through recognition of one another 
displayed through engagement with one another’s words 
and deeds. This kind of encounter draws on conceptions of 
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politics in ancient Greece, not as the formal mechanisms of 
state, nor as the technocratic organization of work, but as 
a realm in which individual, mutually constituted human 
beings come together and build a common world. Politics is 
the arena through which humans present themselves to the 
world qua human, the space for “appearance” as equal and 
distinct individuals. 
Formal political mechanisms of state are based on rep-
resentational politics, and asylum seekers had no repre-
sentative in this realm. They astutely reached out to people 
outside detention as “fellow human beings.” Mohammed 
explained, “The problem was because we saw a lot of things. 
Government accuse us, abuse us, and a lot in the TV, and 
we want to tell ‘We are here, we are human beings, we’re not 
more than anything, just we are same as you.’” Issaq hoped 
that the protests would open a space in which he and other 
detainees could “just reflect our feelings to another human 
being, just to see us not as a danger but as another human 
being who escaped from danger.” 
Detainee Action to Create an Alternative Polis
Asylum seekers in detention recognized that gaining entry 
to the formal Australian polis would likely take several years, 
but the need to belong to a community in which one’s speech 
and action is meaningful, in which one’s equality and dig-
nity is recognized, is ever-present. Asylum seekers formed 
their own political communities inside the detention net-
work. These smaller groups could not ensure people’s civic 
rights in the manner of a nation-state, but they nonetheless 
established a basis for protecting individual human dignity 
and exercising human capacities. Through protest, asylum 
seekers were able to experience their own agency and offer 
support and recognition to one another. Sayed explained 
that protest gave him a sense of confidence and agency:
You gain self-confidence because in the environment you are in, 
you are depending for everything and you abide by the rules, so 
you have to do like they tell you to do. They set the time for food, 
you don’t have control on anything. When we do something like 
that, … it’s like a self-independence type of thing. That’s what 
happens. That’s why we protest like, because you are achieving 
something, even though you’re not, in the short term, yes you are, 
but in the long run you won’t, but still you will say, you will gain 
the self-confidence. 
Inside detention, detainees discussed and analyzed their 
situation, their place within Australian politics, the ethics 
and efficacy of different actions, and ways to speak directly 
to the Australian public. These communities extended 
beyond individual relationships and individual detention 
centres, and across linguistic, religious, and ethnic divides. 
Within these communities, detainees addressed each other 
by name, and their opinions were made significant, at least 
at a very local level through a shared sense of solidarity and 
belonging. These political communities reassured detainees 
that they mattered: “A lot of things for other people we done 
as well to show the support to other things, people that look 
out at you, ‘You are not alone, don’t kill yourself. We help 
you out. We try to help you as well.’ Yeah, plenty of things … 
They were doing it as well for me too” (Baha’adin). 
Emad saw this interconnectedness not only as situational 
interpersonal care, which is a matter of the private realm, 
but as fundamental to politics based on mutual respect and 
recognition, and to the human condition: “So we all try 
in this world to do something better, because I can’t live 
this life by myself without seeing you smile in this world, 
because I’ll be frustrated at that time. You know, I want to 
live with other humans who are happy. And I want to see 
them, you know, achieve their goals in this life.” 
Conclusion
Detainees pleaded for recognition as fellow human beings. 
As Emad put it, “I’m not a perfectionist, I’m not calling for 
100 per cent. I need the minimum when someone treats me 
as a human, not like an object inside the detention centre.” 
Detainees sought to restore their rights by gaining formal 
entry to the Australian political community through for-
mal refugee applications and through protest. In parallel 
to using rights-based institutional mechanisms for restora-
tion of the right to have rights, detainees drew on moral 
and philosophical discourse of human rights, centring 
on the “human.” To be stripped of rights is no distant or 
academic experience, it is intensely intimate, at once both 
personal and political. The protests and actions of refugees 
in detention were aimed at “us,” actual people. They were 
intended to trigger a sentimental, human response and so 
to insert themselves into the polis, in the absence of bureau-
cratic recognition, through human-to-human recognition. 
Arendt’s model of human rights as arising only from human 
determination carries with it the realization that “we” have 
the power to affect human rights and to decide who falls 
within the mutual guarantee. Detainees demonstrated their 
understanding of this view and pushed for recognition by 
the Australian community beyond the legal and bureau-
cratic systems. Detainees may be granted a visa and with it, 
certain legal rights based on re-categorization as a “refugee,” 
but achieving the sort of human rights that Arendt speaks 
of, of belonging, equality, and distinction relies on deeper 
political (in the ancient Greek sense) recognition. Shahin 
expressed it beautifully: 
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It is a massive thing to live with the title of “refugee.” Which is 
something that you are bestowed on, you didn’t choose it, you 
didn’t pick it. You thought you are making a freedom of move-
ment to get out of a problem that you are in, and now you are in 
another type of trouble, and there is a title for you to carry on. It is 
very understandable that a lot of people don’t want to be called by 
that title, and as soon as you go out, that’s the first thing that you 
get. Not many of us feel comfortable with that, but some of us feel 
like, I don’t know, I would like to … this is something that is on 
me now. I would like to define it the way that I fulfill it. So yes, I’m 
a refugee, I’m from Iran, but I’m a human being with these pas-
sions, these emotions, this laughter, and these crying moments. 
You know, like any other human being. And that is the way that I 
am that refugee.
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